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Much has been written about the right of people with mental disabili-
ties to receive treatment in the community. Several scholars have worked
to ground a right to community-based treatment in various state and fed-
eral statutes or constitutional provisions. Very little attention, however,
has been paid to the way in which the costs of community-based treat-
ment have entered into courts' opinions. Helen L. v. DiDario,2 a case
celebrated by disabilities rights advocates for its expansive interpretation
of the right to receive treatment in the most integrated setting, has raised
puzzling and pressing questions about the role of costs in the right to
community-based treatment under the Americans with Disabilities Act3
("ADA"). In Helen L., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ordered
Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare to provide the plaintiff
with nursing care in her own home instead of in the state's nursing home,
but the court was extremely vague about the extent to which the fact that
home-based care was less expensive influenced its reasoning. The Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals's recent decision in L. C. v. Olmstead has
planted the seeds of a circuit split on the issue of costs, which may lead
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1. For an exploration of several federal constitutional sources of the right to community-
based treatment for people with mental disabilities, see Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic of Identity
and the Politics of Justice: Establishing a Right to Community-Based Treatment for the Institu-
tionalized Mentally Disabled, 18 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (1992). For a
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2. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995).
4. See 46 F.3d at 338.
5. No. 97-8538, 1998 WL 163707 (11th Cir. Apr. 8,1998).
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the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a future case concerning the
costs of community-based treatment. These costs are thus likely to play
an increasingly important role in judicial opinions deciding the right to be
treated in the community and challenge advocates to articulate an ap-
proach to costs that will best promote the integration of people with dis-
abilities.
This challenge is not new. By looking at the ways in which courts have
approached the costs of integration in the past, we can gain insight into
how advocates for people with disabilities should urge courts to consider
costs in the future. Part I of this Note begins with the legislative history of
the ADA in an effort to explain how and why costs are relevant to the
integration of people with disabilities. Part II then describes three "pure
approaches" to costs that courts have employed and provides examples
of each. Part III examines the record of how courts have considered costs
in articulating the rights of the institutionalized under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part IV traces the history of judicial treatment of costs un-
der the statutory framework of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
19736 and the ADA. Part V then returns to the three pure approaches
adopted in recent caselaw and asks the question: "Where should we go
from here?" For those whose goal is to promote the integration of people
with disabilities, the question is one of strategy. The history of courts'
treatment of costs in the constitutional and statutory arenas should in-
form the answer. The advocate's task will be to construct an approach to
costs that is likely to further the goal of integration which lies at the heart
of the ADA.
I. A THRESHOLD QUESTION: WHY COSTS?
This Note focuses on what the advocate's approach to costs should
be, because the different ways in which courts handle costs lead to very
different outcomes for people with disabilities. In this sense, costs are as-
sumed to be part of the analysis. As a practical matter, advocates and
lawyers must form their legal strategies within the framework as it ap-
pears in the caselaw, but they must also understand the origins of the
framework to advocate effectively. Before analyzing the various judicial
approaches to the costs of community-based treatment, we must first ask
how the right to community-based treatment became inextricably linked
to costs.
6. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985).
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A. The Integration Mandate
To implement the statutory provisions of title II of the ADA,7 the
Department of Justice promulgated the following regulation, dubbed the
integration mandate: "A public entity shall administer services, pro-
grams, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities."8
The integration mandate prompts important threshold questions: If a
public entity's failure to administer its services in the "most integrated
setting" is, by definition, discrimination, then why should there be a con-
cern for costs at all? If community-based treatment is medically appro-
priate for an individual with a disability, and the state is keeping that in-
dividual in an institution, is this not discrimination, plain and simple?
Unfortunately, the answer thus far has been no, for two reasons. The
first reason stems from the muddy legislative history of the ADA, which
seems both to invite courts to and to preclude courts from considering
costs. The second reason relates to the nature of disability-based dis-
crimination itself.
B. The Debate Surrounding Legislative History
Since the ADA was passed, scholars, lawyers, and judges have disa-
greed about the extent to which the law should be read merely as an ex-
tension of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("section 504"),
an earlier federal statute prohibiting disability-based discrimination, to
local governments and private actors. Because the caselaw under section
504 involves considering costs through the "undue burden" test, the ques-
tion of whether or not (and how far) Congress meant to depart from sec-
tion 504 in enacting the ADA becomes important in understanding how
costs have infiltrated courts' analyses under the ADA's integration man-
date. It is beyond the scope of this Note to canvass the entire legislative
history of the ADA to determine whether Congress intended the section
504 cost analysis to be incorporated into the integration mandate of the
ADA. The discussion here seeks only to illustrate that the line between
section 504 and the ADA is unclear.
Legislative history has been cited frequently to support the proposi-
tion that the ADA demands no more and nothing different from section
504. The House Judiciary Conmittee stated that title II of the ADA is to
"work in the same manner as section 504, ' and the House Committee on
Education and Labor explained that title II of the ADA "simply extends
7. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12165 (West 1995).
8. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1997).
9. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 473.
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the anti-discrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 to all actions
of state and local governments."10 In enacting the ADA, Congress incor-
porated the remedies, procedures, and rights pertaining to section 504
that were enacted by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act Amendments of 1978.11 The ADA's in-
corporation of section 504 standards has led many courts to incorporate
the reasoning of cases decided under section 504 into cases decided under
the ADA 2
Advocates for people with disabilities may be at a loss for what to
make of these directives and may wonder whether departures in ADA
provisions from their section 504 counterparts are legally insignificant.
There are two schools of thought. Jonathan Drimmer argues that
"although the initial bill.., demanded more stringent standards than
those developed in section 504, the final Act was a compromise which
presented a grant of limited rights and a weak condemnation of discrimi-
nation."13 On the other hand, Timothy Cook argues persuasively that, de-
spite these directives, the ADA cannot be read as a mere re-enactment of
section 504.14 "[G]iven the congressional findings, legislative history, and
caselaw regarding the continued persistency and the stigmatic evils of
segregation," Cook writes, "Congress would not have simply reenacted
without clarification the identical requirements it enacted seventeen
years previously to little effect."' 5 Instead, he argues that Congress meant
to eliminate the confusion resulting from "a potpourri of substantially in-
consistent regulations"' 6 promulgated by the various federal agencies
pursuant to section 504 and to clarify the existing law. Because the legis-
lative history can be read to support both Cook's position 7 and the posi-
tion that the ADA does not differ substantially from section 504, there is
simply no clear answer to the question of how far, in general, Congress
meant to deviate from section 504 in enacting the ADA.
Unfortunately, it is even less clear to what extent Congress meant to
depart from section 504 with respect to the costs of integration. The
10. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 367.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12133 (West 1995).
12. See, e.g., Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (stating that the
legislative history of title II illustrates Congress' intent that the statute be interpreted consis-
tently with section 504).
13. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers and Civil Rights: Tracing the
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L.
REv. 1341,1400 (1993).
14. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REv. 393 (1991).
15. Id. at 416.
16. Id. at 415.
17. See iL at 415-39.
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regulations promulgated under section 504 have led courts to recognize
two central defenses to discrimination under section 504. The "undue
burden" defense allows defendants to argue that the accommodation
sought by the plaintiff is simply too expensive to bear. The "substantial
modification" or "fundamental alteration" defense says that defendants
are not required to make fundamental changes to a program if doing so
would compromise the program's integrity.
The Department of Justice included only the fundamental alteration
defense in the regulations specifying the scope of the ADA's integration
mandate.8 In fact, as Cook notes, the undue financial burden defense
was omitted in accordance with congressional instruction. 9 Furthermore,
Cook contends that Congress intentionally omitted the cost defense be-
cause it determined, as evidenced by the legislative history, that the bene-
fits of integrating persons with disabilities far outweigh the costs.c2 As
part of a statutory compromise, the cost or "undue burden" defense re-
mained only for those portions of the ADA rules governing architectural
and communications barriers.2'
Cook's analysis distinguishes those provisions for which Congress
might have intended to allow the undue burden or cost defense from
those for which it did not. The Department of Justice, however, included
an appendix to section 35.150 that muddies Cook's clean analysis:
Many commenters asked that the Department clarify a public entity's obliga-
tions within the integrated program when it offers a separate program but an
individual with a disability chooses not to participate in the separate pro-
gram .... [T]he extent to which that individual must be provided with modi-
fications in the integrated program will depend not only on what the individ-
ual needs but also on the limitations and defenses of this part. For example, it
may constitute an undue burden for a public accommodation, which provides
a full-time interpreter in its special guided tour for individuals with hearing
impairments, to hire an additional interpreter for those individuals who
choose to attend the integrated program.
In this appendix the undue burden defense, and with it the language
of costs, creeps in the back door.
The task of interpreting the complex legislative history of the ADA
18. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,
unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997) (emphasis
added). It is noteworthy that § 35.130(b)(7) comes before and does not appear to modify §
35.130(d), though no court has read § 35.130(d) without considering the fundamental alteration
defense in § 35.130(b)(7).
19. See Cook, supra note 14, at 430-31.
20. Id at 457-65.
21. See id. at 462 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12134(b) (West 1998)).
22. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A at § 35.130 (1997) (emphasis added).
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best lies with Cook and his fellow scholars. For purposes of this Note, it is
enough to acknowledge that the line between section 504 and the ADA
is far from clear. Thus, while the ADA integration mandate itself does
not appear to contemplate the costs of community-based treatment, costs
may have entered simply because of the uncertain relationship between
section 504 and the ADA.
C. The Continuing Relevance of Disability
A second explanation for courts' consideration of costs is linked to
the nature of disability-based discrimination. In his thorough analysis of
the legislative history of the ADA, Cook draws an analogy between the
segregation of people with disabilities and racial segregation.3 According
to Cook, it is plain from the ADA's legislative history that Congress re-
garded the logic in Brown v. Board of Education24 that "[s]eparate ... fa-
cilities are inherently unequal"' as relevant to the situation of people
with disabilities.26 Given the legislative history of the ADA, Cook argues,
classifications that segregate persons with disabilities are presumptively
illegal and, like racial classifications, ought to be subject to strict scru-
tiny 7
Why, then, is the ADA's integration mandate not the equivalent of
the desegregation mandate in Brown? One reason stems from an impor-
tant difference between racial discrimination and disability-based dis-
crimination. When we talk about eradicating racial discrimination, our
ultimate goal (in most cases) is to remove barriers. Exactly what kinds of
policies are needed to remove what kinds of barriers, and for exactly how
long these policies will be needed, are hotly contested.2 But for the dis-
abilities community, removing barriers is only half of the story. Equality
also means ongoing "special" treatment. At times we advocates work to
rid society of its prejudices, yet we do not work to create a disability-
neutral world. Instead we strive to create a world in which disability is en-
23. See Cook, supra note 14, at 434.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Cook, supra note 14, at 409-11 (discussing the impact 6f
Brown on the definition of injury from discrimination and segregation).
25. Id. at 495.
26. For a thorough treatment of the analogies drawn between race and disability by ADA
supporters and examples of the impact of Brown on those who spoke in favor of the ADA, see
Cook, supra note 14, at 410, n.120.
27. See id at 433-34.
28. It is beyond the scope of this Note to deal adequately with competing visions of racial
equality. For some thinkers, racial equality requires explicit recognition of racial difference and
race-based policies that may or may not be aimed at creating a race-neutral world. The point
here is only to note that "separate is inherently unequal" is rather unhelpful in the disabilities
arena, where mere integration, even without ongoing animus, necessarily will generate inequal-
ity. There can be no level playing field; individualized treatment is precisely what is necessary
for equality.
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tirely and forever relevant.
Ira Burnim's discussion of the dual goals of the ADA-"equal treat-
ment" and "special treatment"-is illuminating here.29 Burnim notes that
much of the work done in combating disability-based discrimination has
focused on removing barriers to equal treatment.30 At the same time,
neutral rules may operate to disadvantage and exclude people with dis-
abilities, necessitating special treatment and creating conflicting ideals in
the disabilities community.3'According to Burnim, the advocates' solution
to this "dilemma of difference" has been to insist on equal treatment
when doing so promotes independence and integration for people with
disabilities, and to insist on special treatment when doing so promotes
these same aims.32 This solution has replaced the tension between equal
and special treatment with the question of how best to promote the inte-
gration and independence of people with disabilities?3
This new focus, says Burnim, presents a problem because there are
competing visions of how best to achieve integration and foster inde-
pendence. His insight is essential to understanding the entrance of costs:
As soon as competing visions are considered, talk of expense is bound to
enter the discussion as one criterion of measurement. Once one aban-
dons a clear mandate in a search for the best of several alternatives, one
must have some means of comparison. Is institutional treatment more
segregative than treating people in the community or in their homes?
The question can be answered no longer in the language of Brown. The
force of the statement "separate is inherently unequal" is replaced with
the salience of the question "Which better advances the (long-term) in-
dependence and (eventual) integration of people with disabilities?"
There is room for more than one answer, and room to consider which is
less expensive.
Another way in which the continuing relevance of disability leads to
discussions of costs and "reasonableness" involves the role of the judici-
ary. Robert Burt notes that traditional litigation has relied upon the no-
tion that there will come a time when the plaintiff's claims are satisfied
and her rights made secure.35 According to Burt, "the idea that 'rights-
satisfied freedom' must be an attainable goal for a complaining litigant
29. Ira A. Burnim, "Equal Treatment" and "Special Treatment": Considerations in ADA
Implementation, in CHOICE & RESPONSiBILrrY, 245-57 (Clarence J. Sundram ed., 1994).
30. See iad at 245-48.
31. See id. at 251-52.
32. See id. at 253.
33. See id. at 253.
34. See id.
35. Robert Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 265, 309-11
(R.H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
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has traditionally served to provide rough conceptual boundaries for the
otherwise limitless trump card of 'rights."'36 The boundary has been
"eroded in practice," he says, in institutional cases in which it is difficult
to imagine the parties' disengagement, and especially in cases in which
the mental impairments of the plaintiffs create a continual need for pro-
tection, rather than freedom, from the constraints of defendants.3
Burt's reasoning can be extended easily to cases involving people with
mental disabilities who want to be treated in their communities. Such
plaintiffs do not envision future disengagement from the defendants they
sue: Their disabilities and the nature of their claims dictate that there will
be some form of continuous involvement. Burt notes that this conceptual
problem of "insatiable demand" is implicit in the cases involving institu-
tional reform because, quite arguably, a "huge, if not limitless, amount of
resources, would be required to assure any improvement.01 His observa-
tions point toward yet another explanation for the discussions of costs in
ADA integration mandate cases. To the extent that the plaintiffs' dis-
abilities in these cases require defendants' continued involvement and
large resources are at stake, a discussion of resources and "reasonable"
limits on insatiable demand becomes inevitable. Perhaps such limits were
not discussed explicitly in Brown because in 1954 viewing school deseg-
regation within the framework of disentanglement was possible.
To summarize, costs have become part of the discussion under the in-
tegration mandate for two main reasons: a legislative history replete with
unclear directives about how costs should be treated; and the nature of
disability itself. Both factors force the integration mandate from the
world of "separate is inherently unequal" to a "reasonable" balancing
and consideration of costs.
II. THREE PURE APPROACHES
Having examined the threshold question of how costs came into the
courts' analyses under the integration mandate, we can now turn to the
different approaches to costs available to courts. Courts have adopted at
least three "pure approaches." The pure no-costs approach says that in-
tegration should be pursued regardless of cost. A second pure approach,
dubbed the efficiency approach, requires the pursuit of only those inte-
grative steps that are more cost-efficient than their segregative counter-
parts. A third, the strict separation of powers approach holds that the
court must reject any claim requiring re-allocation of a state's funds,
36. Id. at 309.
37. Id. at 309.
38. Id. at 310.
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whether more or less efficient. Examples of the use and implications of
the efficiency and separation of powers approaches are given below. The
pure approaches unpack the ambiguities in Helen L. and explore the
various directions in which courts may go in the wake of that decision. 9
A. The Efficiency Approach
In Williams v. Wasserman,4° ("Wasserman") residents of state institu-
tions with developmental disabilities challenged the state's failure to im-
plement their treating professionals' recommendations for community-
based care. The defendants characterized the relief sought by plaintiffs as
a redesign of the state's mental health care system requiring hundreds of
community treatment slots. The plaintiffs argued that they sought not a
fundamental alteration of the state's programs but instead sought
"admission to an existing program of treatment on behalf of plaintiffs for
whom such treatment is recommended."'" In denying the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court held that "genuine disputes of ma-
terial fact remain between the parties concerning the relative cost of insti-
tutionalization as compared to community-based treatment" and that
such costs needed to be determined to assess the presence or absence of
an "undue financial burden.
4 2
The court in Wasserman employed the efficiency approach, which in-
volves a comparison of the costs of integration with the costs of main-
taining existing segregation. The approach raises interesting questions as
to which costs courts ought to incorporate into the analysis. For example,
one might ask whether the costs of housing the plaintiffs should be con-
sidered a cost of community-based treatment. This question is difficult to
answer, since some plaintiffs will have housing available to them outside
of the institution (making community-based treatment less burdensome
than institutionalization on the state) and others may be otherwise
homeless. More importantly, the efficiency approach seems to ignore the
societal costs of segregation itself. Interpreting the ADA as requiring a
strictly dollars-and-cents analysis, while its integration mandate places an
obvious premium on integration, is highly questionable.
B. The Separation of Powers Approach
Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services43
39. A case example of the no-costs approach appears below after the discussion of Helen L.
See infra Subsection II.C.2.
40. 937 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1996).
41. Id. at 528.
42. Id.
43. 609 N.E.2d 447 (Mass. 1993).
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("Williams") offers a very different approach to the cost question. The
plaintiffs in Williams were homeless individuals with mental disabilities
who argued that Massachusetts's Department of Mental Health
("DMH") had not provided a sufficient amount of integrated housing to
satisfy the requirements of the ADA integration mandatei 4 The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held that DMH had not violated the ADA,
finding that "nothing in the ADA requires that a specific proportion of
housing placements provided by a public mental health service be in
'integrated' housing."'45 Relying on Alexander v. Choate,46 the Williams
court made clear its perceived duty to keep the effect of the Act within
"manageable bounds." 47
Unlike the court in Wasserman, the Williams court was unwilling to
entertain efficiency arguments made by the plaintiffs. Although the plain-
tiffs had repeatedly pointed to Wisconsin's mental health services system
as a model of a more efficient and practical structure for providing care
to the mentally ill, the Williams court stated: "[t]hat another State,
through legislation, allegedly applies its resources more effectively is an
argument better made to the Legislature, not to the courts., 48
C. An Unclear Directive
The pure approaches are useful tools for unpacking Helen L., a case
which will undoubtedly affect the availability of community-based treat-
ment for people with disabilities. As discussed below, the court's ambi-
guity in Helen L. opens the door for courts to consider costs in potentially
disparate ways, and, under one radical interpretation, to push costs out of
the integration mandate altogether.
In Helen L., nursing home resident Idell S. joined an action against
the secretary of Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare ("DPW")
alleging that DPW violated the integration mandate of the ADA by re-
quiring her to receive the care that she needed in the segregated setting
of a nursing home rather than in her own home through the Depart-
49
ment's attendant care program.
Idell S. was a 43-year-old mother of two who had contracted meningi-
tis, leaving her paralyzed from the waist down. Because of her disability,
Idell S. used a wheelchair and needed assistance with daily living activi-
44. See id at 452.
45. Ld. at 452.
46. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). This case and others brought under section 504 are discussed be-
low. See infra Part IV.
47. Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 453 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,299 (1985)).
48. Id. at 455 n.7.
49. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 327-28 (3d Cir. 1995).
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ties such as bathing, laundry, shopping and cleaning. Both parties to the
action stipulated that although Idell S. was not capable of fully independ-
ent living, she was not so incapacitated that she needed the custodial care
of a nursing home.
DPW operated two different programs providing people with physical
disabilities with assistance in daily living: nursing home care and treat-
ment in the community through the attendant care program.51 After
spending four years as a resident of the Philadelphia Nursing Home, Idell
S. was evaluated and deemed eligible for the attendant care program,52
which provided "[t]hose basic and ancillary services which enable an in-
dividual [with physical disabilities] to live in his [or her] home and com-
munity rather than in an institution and to carry out functions of daily
living, self-care and mobility."53 Because of a lack of funding, Idell S. was
placed on a waiting list for the program and continued to live in the
nursing home, separated from her family and community.-
1. Helen L and the Separation of Powers Approach
In ruling for Idell S., the court rejected DPW's argument that since
funding for nursing home services and the attendant care program for the
fiscal year had already been appropriated by the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania, shifting funds from the nursing home care appropriation to
attendant care would constitute a fundamental alteration of the pro-
gram.5 Providing attendant care services to Idell S. in her home would
not be a fundamental alteration, the court reasoned, as Idell S. was nei-
ther asking that DPW alter its requirements for admission to the program
nor requesting that the substance of the program be altered to accommo-
date her.,6 Dismissing DPW's assertion that under state constitutional law
the secretary could not move funds from one budget line to another, the
court boldly declared: "It is not now up to us to invent a funding mecha-
nism whereby the Commonwealth can properly finance its nursing home
and attendant care programs. However, the ADA applies to the General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, and not just to DPW." The court concluded
that although DPW was under no obligation to provide Idell S. with any
care at all, "since the Commonwealth has chosen to provide services to
50. See id. at 328.
51. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3051-3055 (1996) (setting forth the Attendant Care Services
Act).
52. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 329.
53. See 62 P.S. § 3053 (1996).
54. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 329.
55. See id at 337-38.
56. See id
57. Id at 338.
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Idell S. under the ADA, it must do so in a manner which comports with
the requirements of that statute."58
Thus, in Helen L. the Third Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly re-
jected the separation of powers reasoning in Williams and thereby found
budget shifting not to be a fundamental alteration. Instead, it reversed
the judgment of the lower court, which had relied on Williams:
Even though defendant Snider concedes that it is more expensive and less
salutary for plaintiffs to remain in a nursing home rather than receive atten-
dant care services, this admission does not authorize the Court to adjust the
Department's allocation of resources or provision of services. Plaintiffs assert
that the fact that they would be served better by attendant care services dis-
tinguishes their case from Williams. Given the separation of powers reason-
ing in Williams that requires courts to avoid involving themselves in adminis-
trative agency policy decisions, I am unable to agree.
Notably, the district court applied the Williams separation of powers
analysis even where the increased efficiency of the plaintiffs' proposal, as
compared to the defendants', was undisputed. Because the Court of Ap-
peals did not explicitly address the separation of powers issue in its
opinion, it is possible, on one hand, that it departed from the Williams
court's reasoning only very narrowly in the case before it, in which a
small amount of money available in another line of the budget needed to
be re-allocated to an eligible applicant to an existing state program. Un-
der such an interpretation of Helen L., the court would be expected to
reject two types of ADA claims: those in which the more integrative set-
ting was more expensive, and those in which any remedy was likely to in-
volve more extensive restructuring of the state's appropriations.
2. Helen L. and the No-Costs Approach
One could also read Helen L. to say that costs are irrelevant. The
Helen L. court simply ordered DPW to admit a qualified applicant to an
existing program. Shifting funds was not a fundamental alteration, and
fulfilling its own obligations under state law was not an unreasonable or
undue burden. Following this logic, the court did not need to enter into a
cost analysis to reach its conclusion.
The court in Charles Q. v. 0. Houstoun put such a spin on Helen L.
In Charles Q., two of the four plaintiffs were patients at a state psychiat-
ric facility seeking community placements under the integration mandate.
Defendants argued, as did the defendants in Helen L., that appropria-
58. Id. at 339.
59. Helen L. v. DiDario, No. CIV.A. 92-6054, 1994 WL 22714, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27,
1994).
60. No. CIV. A. 1:CV-95-280,1996 WL 447549 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1996).
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tions for the fiscal year for mental health services had already been made.
They maintained that shifting funds from the hospital budget would
cause decreases in the quality of care and the "unavailability of funds for
such basic patient needs as food, water, heat, medication and psychiatric
and medical services."'" Accommodating plaintiffs by using existing funds
from the budget for community-based programs, they argued, would
cause a reduction or elimination of the services provided by these pro-
grams.62 Without noting which treatment-hospital or community-
based-would be more expensive, the court held that defendants' argu-
ments had been foreclosed by Helen L. because "the Third Circuit stated
that a fundamental alteration in a program must change its requirements
or its substance.... An agency's claim that it lacks funding to serve a dis-
abled person is not sufficient."63
Thus, the Charles Q. court interpreted the Helen L. holding that
budget shifting was not a fundamental alteration to be wholly independ-
ent of the fact that for DPW treating Idell S. in the community through
the attendant care program was more cost-efficient. Taking the no-costs
approach, the Charles Q. court read the cost discussion in Helen L. as
mere dicta.
3. Helen L. and the Efficiency Approach
The most curious aspect of Helen L., however, is the way in which
costs creep into the court's apparent dicta:
Ironically, DPW asserts a justification of administrative convenience to resist
an accommodation which would save an average of $34,500 per year, would
allow Idell S. to live at home with her children, and which would not require
a single substantive change in its attendant care or nursing home programs.
The court was careful to separate its finding that re-arranging Penn-
sylvania's appropriations was not a fundamental alteration from its dis-
cussion of costs. But one wonders if the Helen L. court would have or-
dered the budget shifting had the attendant care not been significantly
cheaper. If it had been more expensive, would the court have been com-
fortable with its involvement in the appropriations made by the state
legislature, or would the doctrine of the separation of powers have been
part of the court's analysis? What if there had been a group of similarly
situated plaintiffs in need of attendant care, adding significant adminis-
trative costs to integration and increasing the bundle of money re-
appropriated by the court? How might the cost calculus, only a backdrop
61. Id. at *5.
62. See id.
63. Id. at *6.
64. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d at 338.
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in Helen L., have changed had Idell S. been homeless?
"These questions are relevant to the analysis if one adopts the effi-
ciency approach outlined above in Wasserman. Indeed, the Wasserman
court characterized the Helen L. court as having "emphasiz[ed] that the
program was already in existence and was less expensive than the nursing
home program."6 In L. C. v. Olmstead,66 the court put a similar efficiency
spin on Helen L. In L.C., two mentally retarded persons institutionalized
in a state mental hospital argued that they were entitled to community-
based treatment under the integration mandate. 67 In granting plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on their ADA claim, the court relied on
Helen L. and rejected the argument that continued institutionalization of
the plaintiffs was justified by a lack of funding for the community-based
programs.6 However, the court added that:
[T]here is no dispute that defendants already have existing programs pro-
viding community services to persons such as plaintiffs. It is also undisputed
that defendants can provide services to plaintiffs in the community at consid-
erably less cost than is required to maintain them in an institution. Thus, de-
fendants cannot demonstrate that any fundamental alteration of their pro-
gram is required in order to serve plaintiffs appropriately in the community.
The court's reasoning implies that, had the community-based treat-
ment been more expensive than institutionalization, defendants might
have availed themselves of the fundamental alteration defense. Unlike
the Charles Q. court, the L.C. court did not read the cost discussion in
Helen L. as mere dicta, choosing instead to adopt an efficiency approach
to costs.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied a modified efficiency
approach in its recent review of L.C., in which it remanded the case to
the district court for further findings relating to the state's fundamental
alteration defense and the costs of community-based treatment.70 Specifi-
cally, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the lower court had failed to con-
sider evidence that because of the fixed overhead costs of providing insti-
tutional care, the state would be able to save money through community-
based treatment only if entire hospitals or hospital wings were closed, but
not by moving only one or two patients from a hospital into the commu-
nity.71 Noting that the ADA might still require the state to expend addi-
65. Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524,530-31 (D. Md. 1996).
66. CIV.A. No. 1:95-CV-1210-MHS, 1997 WL 148674 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997), aff'd in
part and remanded inpart, No. 97-8538 1998 WL 163707 (11th Cir. Apr. 8,1998).
67. See id. at *l.
68. See id. at *4.
69. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
70. 1998 WL 163707 at *1.
71. See id. at *13.
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tional funds to integrate the plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit asked the
lower court to consider whether the fiscal burden on the state would be
"so unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental health budget
that it would fundamentally alter the service it provides," whether re-
quiring the state to transfer funds from institutionalized to community-
based care would be unreasonable, and whether the difference in the cost
of providing institutional or community-based care would lessen the
state's financial burden.7 The Eleventh Circuit thus left room for the
finding that forcing a transfer of funds would be unreasonable and consti-
tute an undue burden, a holding declined by the Third Circuit in Helen L.
and in Charles Q. Perhaps more importantly, the Eleventh Circuit in L.C.
held explicitly that costs were relevant to the fundamental alteration de-
fense-a holding in direct conflict with the Charles Q, no-costs interpre-
tation of Helen L.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Charles Q., Wasserman, and L.C. offer a glimpse of how Helen L.
leaves room for courts to interpret its cost language in different ways.
This potential for disparate rulings challenges advocates to construct a
normatively desirable approach to costs under the integration mandate
and to push courts to adopt that approach. Specifically, the advocate's
task is to think carefully about which approach to cost would best pro-
mote integration.
This Part describes the history of the courts' treatment of the costs of
community-based treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment and
highlights the similarities between constitutional analysis and the rea-
soning in recent ADA caselaw, as outlined in Part II. Early decisions in-
volving the rights of institutionalized persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment did not contemplate the costs of community-based treat-
ment. Later, when finances came to the fore, courts began to issue opin-
ions incorporating conflicting approaches to costs. The result was a
hodge-podge of inconsistent rulings not unlike the recent ADA caselaw
outlined in Part II. As explained below, the irrepressibility of costs in the
constitutional context should cause advocates to question the wisdom of
arguing that costs are irrelevant in the ADA context. Put differently, the
constitutional story should make advocates wary of the Charles Q. inter-
pretation of Helen L.
72. Id
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A. Early Decisions
Courts have nearly uniformly rejected the notion that people with
mental disabilities have a constitutionally-founded right to receive treat-
ment in the least restrictive environment?7 No constitutional right per se
to community-based treatment exists. Instead, the notion of a constitu-
tional right to treatment in the community has emerged slowly through
the articulation of a series of vague "rights" that may point toward com-
munity-based treatment. As early as 1966, in Rouse v. Cameron,74 the
D.C. Circuit stated that an institutionalized mental patient has a right to
treatment "adequate in light of present knowledge." 75 The Fifth Circuit
followed suit in Wyatt v. Aderholt,76 finding a "right to such individual
treatment as will help [the civilly committed] to be cured or to improve
[their] mental condition." 77
The extent of the due process rights of the involuntarily committed
was first considered by the Supreme Court in 1982, in the landmark deci-
sion, Youngberg v. Romeo.8 In Romeo, the Supreme Court articulated
three related rights afforded the involuntarily committed: the right to
reasonably safe conditions of confinement, the right to be free from un-
reasonable bodily restraints, and the right to such minimally adequate
training as reasonably might be required by these interests.79 Whether pa-
tients' constitutional rights have been violated, the Court stated, must be
determined by balancing their liberty interests against the interests of the
state. The Court found the balance in the "professional judgment" stan-
dard:
In determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case presenting a
claim for training by the State-we emphasize that courts must show defer-
ence to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By so limiting ju-
dicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by
the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions should
73. See Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1249 (5th Cir. 1987); Society for Goodwill to Re-
tarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir. 1984); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d
266, 267 (3d Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983). For those opin-
ions articulating variations of a right to treatment in the least restrictive environment, see
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d
117, 130 (3d Cir. 1981), Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 161 n.27 (3d Cir. 1980); Covington
v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 125
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (E.D. La. 1976); Woe v.
Matthews, 408 F. Supp. 419,428 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487,501-02 (D.
Minn. 1974).
74. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
75. Id. at 456.
76. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 1312.
78. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
79. Id. at 315-18.
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be minimized.'8
Finally, because professional judgments are to be given presumptive
validity, liability "may be imposed only when the decision by the profes-
sional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsi-
ble actually did not base the decision on such a judgment."8
Romeo, while recognizing the due process rights of the institutional-
ized to safety, freedom from restraint, and minimal training, did not say
any specific method or approach to treatment was required. Thus, what
constituted minimally adequate training was left in the hands of profes-
sionals, and institutions were bound to provide what was deemed mini-
mally adequate by professionals on a case-by-case basis.
B. What About Costs?
Soon after the Romeo decision, one federal judge declared sternly, "If
North Dakota chooses to operate facilities for the mentally retarded, the
operation of these facilities must meet minimal constitutional standards,
and the obligation to meet those standards may not yield to financial con-
siderations.' 'n But what should courts do when the professionals articu-
lating the "minimal constitutional standard" make judgments based on
financial considerations?
In the context of treating people with mental disabilities, where there
is growing professional support behind community-based treatment but a
scarcity of placements, this is precisely the question. Because Romeo did
not instruct professionals to make their recommendations in a vacuum,
nor dictate that they conduct cost analyses, it gave no clear answer.
Lower courts responded in a variety of ways. In Clark v. Cohen, 3 the
court declared that deference to professional judgment requires that the
decision "be one based on medical or psychological criteria and not on
exigency, administrative convenience, or other non-medical criteria.""
The court in Thomas S. v. Flaherty"5 found that professionals were
changing their decisions to conform to available treatment rather than
appropriate treatment."' And in Lelsz v. Kavanagh,87 defendants' pro-
posed modifications of a consent decree containing community place-
80. Id. at 322.
81. Id. at 323.
82. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,484 (D.N.D. 1982).
83. 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
84. Id. at 704.
85. 699 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
86. Id. at 1196.
87. 629 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Tex.), vacated, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1986).
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ment provisions were rejected because they expressly incorporated an
availability standard into professional judgment. According to the Lelsz
court, evidence that the professional judgment was made to conform to
what was available may indicate that the judgment was "a substantial de-
parture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,""
and therefore prohibited by Romeo.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because
"there [was] no evidence" that the professionals "did not take costs into
consideration," it could not be assumed that "the qualified professionals
drafted prohibitively expensive recommendations. The presumption of
validity accorded the professionals' decision about appropriate treatment
has not been rebutted."89 A failure to consider costs, following the court's
logic, might have been a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment.
C. Irrepressible Costs
The tension between including and excluding cost considerations in
professional judgment reached a peak in the Tenth Circuit in Jackson v.
Fort Stanton Hospital,9' where people with developmental disabilities at
two New Mexico institutions brought a due process challenge to their in-
stitutionalization. Finding that the professionals conformed their recom-
mendations to financial constraints, the district court held that
"[i]nstitutional confinement which results from an absence of appropriate
alternatives is not based on professional judgment" and that plaintiffs
were entitled to "treatment recommended by qualified professionals
whose judgment is unsullied by consideration of the fact that the state
does not provide funding for appropriate service in community set-
tings." 91
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the
issue of costs, stating that "reasonable consideration must necessarily in-
corporate a cost analysis. A professional determination that excludes all
considerations of costs and available resources could easily become im-
possible for a state to implement within justifiable budgetary limita-
tions."' The appellate decision in Jackson not only vindicated the deci-
sions of those professionals who had recommended the
institutionalization of their patients because of the unavailability of
placements; by requiring rather than permitting professionals to analyze
88. Id. at 1495.
89. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986).
90. 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 1312.
92. Jackson, 964 F.2d at 992.
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costs, the court implied that a decision to place a patient in the commu-
nity where there was a shortage might amount to a departure from pro-
fessional judgment under Romeo.
Reading Jackson, one cannot help but wonder what would happen in
a state that institutionalized people with mental disabilities but provided
absolutely no treatment in the community. Would professionals be
bound to recommend institutionalization infinitely, even in cases where
community living was essential for "minimal" treatment under the Four-
teenth Amendment? The Jackson court answered tenuously:
We recognize that, by imposing overly extensive cost restrictions in individ-
ual cases, the state could so limit the range of recommendations available to
professionals that their judgment would be rendered inadequate to meet con-
stitutional standards. In such a case, the court might have to enter an order
that would implicate appropriations decisions.
9 3
By postulating a future situation where resources were so slim that
professionals could no longer make decisions to meet "constitutional
standards," thereby necessitating court intervention, the court turned
Romeo on its head. The point made in Romeo was precisely that some-
one needed to be the designated judge of what the constitutional stan-
dard was and that "there certainly is no reason to think judges or juries
are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such deci-
sions."94 The court in Jackson determined that courts, under certain cir-
cumstances to be ascertained by courts, would define the constitutional
minimum.
Moreover, by stating generally that community placement is only one
of various possible ways in which the state may comply with its constitu-
tional obligations, the court effectively said that a state might abandon
community placement altogether, regardless of what a professional might
consider to be necessary for a patient to receive adequate treatment. In
essence, the court protected a threshold level of treatment, the minimum
"constitutional standard," from the tides of legislative appropriation. The
court, quite arbitrarily in light of the emphasis on professional opinion in
Romeo, put community-based treatment above that threshold and out-
side constitutional protection.
D. Similarities
A comparison of courts' treatment of the costs of community-based
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment with the different ap-
proaches to costs under the ADA highlighted in Part II reveals similar
93. Id. at 992.
94. 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
Yale Law & Policy Review
concepts and tensions. Most prominent is the idea of judicial deference.
In Williams, the court was so unwilling to involve itself in what it per-
ceived to be legislative decision making that it took the position that any
cost-based arguments for shifting funds from institutional to community
placements were better addressed to the legislature. The same reluctance
to meddle in legislative business was present in the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals' opinion in Jackson, where the court forecasted court orders
"implicat[ing] appropriation decisions" only in the most dire of circum-
stances. And as was seen in the cases discussed in Part II, there is some
evidence that due process claims involving large numbers of plaintiffs
have been met with greater judicial reluctance to implement professional
recommendations of community placement requiring significant shifting
of state funds. 5
More generally, the strong separation of powers theme in Williams
may be compared to the court's deference to professionals under the
Romeo line of cases, which is strongly rooted in both separation of pow-
ers doctrine and federalism. The professional judgment standard resulted
from the Romeo Court's desire to minimize interference by the federal
judiciary with the internal operations of state institutions.96 In announcing
the professional judgment standard, the Romeo Court avoided constitu-
tionalizing a specific form of treatment and unduly infringing on the
states' powers. In both constitutional and statutory settings, courts have
been wary of infringing on state legislative power. Curiously, in the statu-
tory framework courts have excluded cost analyses that would alter leg-
islative appropriations, while in the constitutional setting courts have
brought costs into the definition of what is reasonable in an effort to
avoid compelling states to provide community placements on a wide
scale.
E. Lessons
Perhaps the most important similarity between the statutory and con-
stitutional settings is the central paradox in the right to community-based
treatment. A person with a mental disability has no substantive due
95. Consider the logic of the court in Thomas S. v. Morrow:
In Society for Goodwill the district court's order that 400 mentally retarded patients be
placed in the community by 1987 was reversed. In Phillips the district court's refusal to
place a class of several hundred mentally retarded adults in the community was af-
firmed. Thus, these decisions do not apply to the facts in Thomas's case, in which a dis-
crete recommendation for treatment was made by qualified professionals to meet the
needs of an individual ....
781 F.2d 367, 376 (1986); see also Gieseking v. Schaffer, 672 F. Supp. 1249, 1267 (quoting Tho-
mas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d at 376).
96. 457 U.S. at 322.
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process right to any care whatsoever unless the state chooses to offer
treatment to him in a state institution, at which point the patient's rights
spring from his loss of liberty. Similarly, as was seen in the four cases
brought under the ADA discussed in Part II, the courts have not yet ar-
ticulated a right to be treated in the community unless the state has cho-
sen to provide some form of community placement. The true irony of
Helen L. is that, under the court's reasoning, the state would not have
been subject to the integration mandate of the ADA had they not chosen
to create the attendant care program. The advocate must therefore pro-
ceed with caution, for the constitutional and statutory bases for treatment
in the community hinge ultimately on the state's initial actions.
Along the same lines, advocates ought to be somewhat nervous about
advocating a strict no-costs approach. If costs were treated as completely
irrelevant to the right to community-based treatment, even for a brief pe-
riod of legal history, states might opt to eliminate their community-based
programs. This scaling back would not occur, obviously, if the programs
were indeed cheaper than their less integrative counterparts and if states
knew so in advance. But in the absence of any undue burden defense,
states might be far less willing to experiment with programs likely to be-
come subject to expansion under the integration mandate.
Indeed, the legislative response might be similar to the knee-jerk re-
action of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jackson. The Tenth Cir-
cuit responded to a ruling that purged professional judgment of any con-
sideration of costs not by permitting costs to be relevant but by requiring
costs to be part of professional judgment and by narrowing considerably
the constitutional protection afforded by Romeo. In short, the middle
ground was lost. It will be interesting to see what becomes of the Charles
Q. ruling, which put a no-costs gloss on Helen L. The lesson may very
well be that the "backlash" that occurred in the Tenth Circuit in the con-
stitutional framework was a one-time occurrence. On the other hand, ad-
vocates may find themselves wishing they had pushed for a more conser-
vative interpretation of Helen L.
IV. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Part III traced the history of courts' approaches to costs in articulat-
ing the constitutional rights of institutionalized people with disabilities.
This Part shall trace the treatment of costs under the statutory predeces-
sor to the ADA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The sec-
tion 504 story highlights the way in which vague notions such as
"institutional integrity" may mutate over time and become extremely
flexible in application. Like courts' treatment of costs under the Four-
teenth Amendment, the history of courts' treatment of costs under sec-
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tion 504 and the ADA cautions against using the no-costs approach and
points advocates toward adopting some degree of cost analysis.
Early cases decided under section 504 incorporated both costs and in-
stitutional integrity into the question of whether a given change or ac-
commodation would overburden defendants. More recently, courts have
considered both costs and institutional integrity in analyzing claims
brought under section 504 and the ADA in which plaintiffs alleged exclu-
sion from programs based on the severity or nature of their disabilities.
There is a sense in which program "integrity" has served to disguise
courts' actual political and economic concerns about forcing integration,
including concerns about the costs of community-based treatment. If this
is the case, advocates may want to acknowledge the irrepressible nature
of costs and consider the merits of the efficiency approach. If courts'
analyses cannot be purged of cost considerations, advocates may at least
strive for explicit and accurate cost discussions.
A. Fundamental Alteration-Early Analyses
The Supreme Court first interpreted section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,98 where the Court
considered whether section 504 forbade professional schools from im-
posing physical qualifications for admission to their clinical training pro-
grams. The Court found that section 504 did not compel Southeastern
Community College to undertake "affirmative action" so that Davis, who
had a bilateral, sensori-neural hearing loss, could be included in the pro-
gram.99 Educational institutions, the Court held, are not required to
"lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommo-
date a handicapped person."' °
Two factors worked together to make the modifications needed to ac-
commodate Davis "substantial" and therefore not required by section
504. First, the Court noted that the regulation requiring that certain kinds
of auxiliary aids be provided to handicapped students 1 explicitly ex-
cludes "devices or services of a personal nature" and that "nothing less
97. The Act provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or un-
der any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. 1997).
98. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
99. Id at 410-11.
100. Id. at 413.
101. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(2) (1997).
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than close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would be sufficient
to ensure patient safety" in the clinical phase of the nursing program'02 In
short, the Court relied on a regulation excusing schools from the costs of
particularly expensive forms of aid. The following passage of the Court's
opinion best captures the cost aspect of the "substantial modification" in
Davis:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirma-
tive action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons always will
be clear .... Technological advances can be expected to enhance opportuni-
ties to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some
useful employment. Such advances also may enable attainment of these goals




The second, and arguably more important, factor in the Court's
analysis involved program integrity, specifically the "freedom of an edu-
cational institution to require reasonable physical qualifications for ad-
mission."""W The Davis Court upheld the freedom of the school to main-
tain its own standards, fearing the cost that would be borne by society if
the school's graduates were to "pose a danger to the public."'05
Thus, the "substantial modification" has two aspects as it was first
employed in Davis. The first aspect involves an implicit evaluation of the
potential costs of accommodation to be borne by the program (in Davis,
the cost of personal attendants). The second aspect involves the institu-
tional integrity of the program and the extent to which the program
would be required to sacrifice its self-determined goals to accommodate
specific disabilities.
In Alexander v. Choate,' the Supreme Court clarified the cost and in-
tegrity notions first employed in Davis. In Alexander, Medicaid recipients
challenged the state of Tennessee's reduction of the number of inpatient
hospital days that state Medicaid would pay hospitals on behalf of a
Medicaid recipient each year1O Plaintiffs argued that the state could limit
the number of days of coverage on a per-stay basis in order to keep its
Medicaid plan within its budget and avoid disproportionately harming
the handicapped.O' Plaintiffs argued alternatively that the annual dura-
tional limitation on inpatient coverage in the state's Medicaid plan could
be replaced by other Medicaid plans that could meet the state's budget-
ary constraints without disproportionately disadvantaging the handi-
102. Davis, 442 U.S. at 409.
103. Id. at 412.
104. I at 414.
105. Id. at 413 n.12.
106. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
107. Id. at 289.
108. See id. at 291.
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capped.'09
In rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments, the Alexander Court empha-
sized the cost aspect of substantial modification as outlined in Davis:
[T]o require that the sort of broad-based distributive decision at issue in this
case always be made in the way most favorable, or least disadvantageous, to
the handicapped•., would be to impose a virtually unworkable requirement
on state Medicaid administrators. Before taking any across-the-board action
affecting Medicaid recipients, an analysis of the effect of the proposed
change on the handicapped would have to be prepared.... It should be ob-
vious that administrative costs of implementing such a regime would be well
beyond the accommodations that are required under Davis.
110
The Court was also concerned with the integrity of programs, charac-
terizing the holding in Davis as a balance struck between "the statutory
rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate
interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their pro-
grams." '' In dealing with issues surrounding the provision of state Medi-
caid, the Court was concerned not only with costs, but also with the free-
dom of the states: "[N]othing in the pre- or post- 1973 legislative
discussion of § 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads
on the States' longstanding discretion to choose the proper mix of
amount, scope, and duration limitations on services covered by state
Medicaid. 112 In Davis, institutional integrity took the form of the free-
dom of educational institutions to define and maintain standards and
goals related to the public welfare. In Alexander, the freedom at issue
was that between the state and the federal government.
Davis and Alexander laid the early foundation for the modern con-
ception of fundamental alteration. Keeping in mind both costs and insti-
tutional integrity, we can turn to fundamental alteration in the context of
community-based treatment to see how costs have entered into the more
recent caselaw under section 504 and the ADA.
B. A Note on Severity of Disability Claims
Because there is no generalized right to community-based treatment
for people with mental disabilities, the concept of fundamental alteration
in the context of community-based treatment most frequently arises in
what are often called "severity of disability" cases-cases in which indi-
viduals with severe or multiple disabilities are denied access to commu-
nity treatment programs offered to other populations of people with dis-
109. See id. at 306.
110. Id at 308.
111. Id. at 300.
112. Id at 307.
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abilities. A few courts, viewing section 504 and the ADA as prohibiting
discrimination between the "disabled" and the "non-disabled," have
been unable to conceive of the "severity" claim and have not permitted it
under section 504.113 However, Martha Minow's view of disability as rela-
tional rather than hierarchical 14 places the so-called "severity of disabil-
ity" claim squarely within the purview of the ADA. Applying Minow's
logic, it makes more sense to view the "severity of disability" claim as a
species of discrimination based on difference rather than as one funda-
mentally distinct from discrimination against the "disabled" vis-a-vis the
"non-disabled." The logical extension of this approach would be to oblit-
erate the distinction in law between the two types of claims."5
This approach is preferable not only because it exposes the relativity
of "difference" or "disability" but because, from the advocate's perspec-
tive, it broadens the scope of section 504 and the ADA. Allowing these
113. Notwithstanding a few notable exceptions, there is considerable caselaw that says that
section 504 and the ADA apply to discrimination on the basis of severity of disability or be-
tween different disabilities. See, e.g., Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1984)
(assuming that the severity of a handicap is itself a handicap protected under section 504);
Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 7 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. (LRP) 390 (D. Conn. Feb. 7,
1996) (refusing to dismiss section 504 and ADA claims that the state refused to consider se-
verely mentally retarded institutional residents for community placement); Martin v. Voinovich,
840 F. Supp. 1175, 1190-92 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that discrimination on the basis of the se-
verity or nature of a disability in providing community housing can be actionable under section
504 and the ADA); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. and Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243,1297-98
(D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
state violated section 504 by denying access to community programs to institutionalized resi-
dents with the most severe mental disabilities); Homeward Bound v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No.
85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at *21 (N.D. Okla. 1987) (holding that denial of community-based
services on the basis of the severity of a disability violates section 504); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F.
Supp. 171, 214-15 (D.N.H. 1981) (holding that state violated section 504 by assuming that indi-
viduals with profound mental retardation could not benefit from community-based services);
Goebel v. Colorado Dep't of Insts., 764 P.2d 785, 804 (Colo. 1988) (stating that discrimination
in the provision of community-based mental health care based on the severity of an individual's
mental disability would violate section 504). But see Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548
(1988) (stating that the central purpose of section 504 is to assure that handicapped individuals
receive evenhanded treatment in relation to nonhandicapped individuals); Cramer v. Florida,
885 F. Supp. 1545, 1551 (Fla. 1995) (finding "that the ADA applies only to discrimination
against disabled persons compared to nondisabled persons"); People First v. Arlington Devel-
opmental Ctr., 878 F. Supp. 97, 101 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding that section 504 does not apply
to discrimination among similarly handicapped persons); Wolford v. Lewis, 860 F. Supp. 1123,
1134 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (stating that evenhanded treatment requirement of section 504 re-
quires "only that disabled individuals receive same treatment as those who are not disabled").
114. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALLTHE DIFFERENCE 173-224 (1990); Martha Minow,
When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and
Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 127-30 (1987).
115. At least one judge has collapsed the distinction explicitly, stating that
[T]he language of § 504 evinces an intent to eliminate handicap-based discrimination
and segregation.... The relevant inquiry is whether the application § 504 [sic] be-
tween persons with different or varying degrees of disability furthers the goal of elimi-
nating disability-based discrimination.... Ultimately, the best test to determine
whether plaintiffs state a claim under § 504 is to examine whether the allegations in
plaintiffs'... complaint touch upon the four elements [that] comprise a § 504 claim.
Martin, 840 F. Supp. 1175,1192 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
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claims to be actionable under section 504 and the ADA would give advo-
cates the hook that they need, and in some jurisdictions already have, to
force state and local governments to open the doors of existing pro-
grams-a very important hook given that thus far advocates have been
largely unable to force governments to create programs under existing
law. Under such an approach, permitting more people with mental dis-
abilities to participate in such programs would not be the expansion of
programs designed and limited by the legislature, but rather the removal
of invidious discrimination in the creation and administration of such
116programs.
C. Fundamental Alteration in Severity of Disability Claims
Because of its potential for expanding existing state community-based
treatment programs, the severity claim has played a central role in recent
ADA litigation. Having looked at the development of the dual nature of
modification under the early section 504 cases, we can now turn to what
constitutes a fundamental alteration in a modern severity claim involving
access to community-based treatment. There is a lesson for advocates to
learn here, as there was in the constitutional narrative given in Part II. As
demonstrated below, advocates should be wary of pushing courts to
adopt the pure no-costs approach, since the flexibility of the doctrine in
this area of law may permit the costs that seep into the analyses to go un-
noticed and unchallenged. The discussion that follows points to an ap-
parent flexibility that courts have in deciding how they will decide
whether a suggested accommodation is a fundamental alteration through
careful manipulation of the two aspects developed in Davis and Alexan-
der.
In Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospitaln7 the court discussed the cost as-
pect but scarcely touched on the institutional integrity aspect of funda-
mental alteration as developed in both Davis and Alexander. The court in
Jackson found that residents of a New Mexico hospital were denied ac-
116. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1). In promulgating this regulation, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) stated that
A recipient [of federal funding], in providing any aid, benefit or service, may not ....
Provide different or separate aid, benefits or services to handicapped persons or to any
class of handicapped persons unless such action is necessary to provide qualified
handicapped persons with aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those pro-
vided to others.
Id. (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130. This regulation, promulgated pursuant to title
II of the ADA, mirrors the above regulation (prohibiting differential treatment of people with
disabilities except insofar as such difference in treatment is necessary to make the aid, benefits,
or services provided to people with disabilities as effective as those provided to others).
117. 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1992).
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cess to community programs because of their severe mental handicaps in
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." Deciding that modi-
fying the existing program to meet plaintiffs' needs was not a fundamen-
tal alteration, the court stated:
The experience of Nebraska and Colorado in serving persons with severe
handicaps shows that modification of the existing community service system
in New Mexico would not require an excessive financial burden and that the
accommodations would enable severely handicapped residents... to realize
the benefits of community settings.
11 9
By contrast, the Third Circuit's opinion in Easley v. Snider ° focuses
predominantly on program integrity, nearly excluding costs from the dis-
cussion. In Easley, plaintiffs with mental disabilities brought an ADA ac-
tion against the Secretary of Pennsylvania's Department of Public Wel-
fare ("DPW") challenging the requirement that participants in DPW's
attendant care program be "mentally alert."' 2' The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that mental alertness was a necessary prerequisite to par-
ticipation in the attendant care program.'2 The mental alertness require-
ment was therefore valid under the ADA regulation prohibiting eligibil-
ity criteria excluding individuals with disabilities, unless such criteria are
necessary.1 3 The criterion was necessary, the court reasoned, because the
"essential nature" of the attendant program was to foster independence
through individual control.'2 4
Allowing surrogates to satisfy the mental alertness requirement, the
court held, would change the focus of the program away from fostering
independence, alter the essential nature of the program and create an
undue and perhaps impossible burden on the state.125 In reaching its con-
clusions, the Easley court relied primarily on the institutional integrity
118. Id. at 1298-99.
119. Id at 1299; see also Homeward Bound v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987
WL 27104 (N.D. Okla.) (holding that the state had discriminated against plaintiffs based on the
severity of their disabilities by failing to consider them for community placements). The Home-
ward Bound court considered the experience of five other states along with the Pennhurst Lon-
gitudinal Study. The study showed that residents of Pennsylvania's Pennhurst Institution were
better off when moved into the community, and that the cost of the community programs was
less than the cost of the institutional programs. See id. at *16-17.
120. 36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 298-99.
122. See id. at 304.
123. This ADA regulation provides that:
A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities
from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria
can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity be-
ing offered.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8)(1997).
124. Easley, 36 F.3d at 304.
125. See id. at 305.
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dimension of fundamental alteration as used in Davis:
The State strives for a level of independence that allows an individual to be-
come an active, contributing member of society, a level of independence ob-
viously greater than one which does nothing more than keep and sustain per-
sons out of institutions. Mental alertness of the physically disabled who
participate in the program is an essential dimension without which the objec-
tives of the program cannot be realized.'
26
Although the court briefly touched on the matter of financial burden,
it did not analyze costs in any detail:
The proposed alteration would create a program that the State never envi-
sioned when it enacted the Care Act. The modification would create an un-
due and perhaps impossible burden on the State, possibly jeopardizing the
whole program, by forcing it to provide attendant care services to all physi-
cally disabled individuals, whether or not mentally alert.1
27
The court's emphasis on program integrity is reminiscent more of the
reasoning in Davis and Alexander than the reasoning in Jackson, where
the cost aspect of fundamental alteration was given primary focus.
Yet what exactly is the value of integrity in the context of Easley? Re-
call that in Davis, the integrity of Southeastern's program was, in the eyes
of the court, tied to the public welfare. And in Alexander, the state's his-
torical power vis-a-vis the federal government was at issue. In Easley, the
court's eagerness to preserve the state's freedom to enact legislative goals
through statute seems to stem from the separation of powers doctrine,
yet this eagerness is puzzling in light of the court's willingness to interfere
with the state's appropriations just months later in Helen L. Even more
puzzling is the court's omission of costs in Easley, as the cost discussion in
the Helen L. opinion compared the costs of institutionalization with the
cost of the very same attendant care program at issue in Easley. Why did
the court not consider the same figures while adding, perhaps, the cost of
a surrogate necessary for a non-mentally alert plaintiff to participate?
One obvious answer to this question might be that the panel in Easley
was genuinely concerned with the separation of powers doctrine in a way
that the panel in Helen L. was not. After all, Idell S. had been admitted
to the attendant care program; therefore, no programmatic change was
necessary.12 Perhaps the Easley court felt that the legislative intent in
drafting the attendant care program was as demanding of judicial protec-
tion as the institutional integrity at stake in Davis and Alexander, and
therefore was unwilling to require modifications regardless of expense.
A second explanation is that the court perceived unforeseen costs
126. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 305.
128. The Helen L. court distinguished Easley on these grounds. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46
F.3d 325,337 n.23 (3d Cir. 1995).
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(other than the costs of surrogates) that made the cost equation much
more complex than the one made explicit in Helen L. For example, the
court may have perceived that one of the costs of allowing the non-
mentally alert population into the program would have been the cost of
housing them, especially if there was a belief that people with mental dis-
abilities would disproportionately become homeless in comparison to the
overall population of people with disabilities released from institutions
through the program.
While only hypothetical, the latter answer is disturbing because it
suggests that costs may enter courts' calculations without being made ex-
plicit, without being rebutted by plaintiffs' counsel, and perhaps without
being accurate. The courts may misperceive the burden on the state as
long as it remains unquantified and overshadowed by notions such as
"program integrity." If costs are entering opinions but are masked by
lengthy analyses of program integrity, or, to put it differently, if the de-
gree of alteration of the "essential nature" or "substance" is truly a proxy
for an underlying but unspoken cost, then the advocate faces a curious
dilemma. Should she risk pushing for cost considerations to be made ex-
plicit without knowing if the cost calculus will cut in future plaintiffs' fa-
vor?
V. WHERE CAN WE Go FROM HERE?
We have come full circle, back to the Third Circuit and the challenge
posed by Helen L. Part IV stressed the flexibility that courts have in
choosing whether to emphasize the financial aspect or the program integ-
rity aspect of fundamental alteration. Advocates, too, make choices
about what they choose to emphasize in litigation in response to what
courts seem to be doing, and can learn from the way in which the costs of
community-based treatment have entered into legal analyses under the
Fourteenth Amendment, section 504, and the ADA.
This Part concludes the discussion of costs in the context of commu-
nity-based treatment by returning to the pure cost approaches outlined in
Part II to make suggestions about what the advocate's approach to costs
should be. The discussion is meant to spark a conversation among advo-
cates about ways in which to think about the costs of community-based
treatment, both in selecting cases and in litigating them. The outline be-
low is only a beginning.
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A. Three Approaches Revisited
1. Separation of Powers
We can begin with the obvious. The separation of powers approach
employed by the court in Williams is often adopted by courts wary of re-
allocating large amounts of money traditionally allocated by the legisla-
ture. It allows courts to avoid looking at the costs and benefits of integra-
tive steps altogether.
The advocate's approach should minimize the likelihood that plain-
tiffs' claims for community-based treatment are dismissed under the
separation of powers approach. Large numbers of plaintiffs-class ac-
tions in particular-are likely to increase the amount of the state's money
at stake and lead a judge to rely on the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers.129 Helen L. highlights the value of the incremental approach. Along
similar lines, generalized claims for community-based treatment are more
likely to invoke the separation of powers approach than claims involving
an individual's entry into an already established program.
2. The No-Costs Approach
The no-costs approach adopted in Charles Q. may appear attractive
at first glance. Many advocates would prefer not to think of accommoda-
tion and integration in cost-benefit terms. However, this Note has
pointed to several warnings. First, the legislative history of the ADA and
the continuing relevance of disability may preclude this approach. Sec-
ond, Part III reviewed a telling history of the treatment of costs under the
Fourteenth Amendment, in which a lower court in the Tenth Circuit
tried to purge the Romeo professional judgment standard of all cost con-
siderations. Costs came back with vengeance on appeal. Indeed, it is ar-
guable that the lower court's strong anti-cost statement ultimately forced
costs and the availability of treatment to play a larger role in the analysis
than they would have had some degree of cost-discussion been adopted
below. The lesson might be that costs are likely to enter in some way, at
some time. Perhaps advocates will be better off acknowledging the reality
of cost constraints in an effort to control and shape the role they play in
future legal analyses. A movement away from the strict no-costs ap-
proach, if it is likely to be rejected by a majority of courts, may be to
plaintiffs' ultimate advantage.
129. Note, however, that the Eleventh Circuit's holding in L.C., see supra notes 70-72 and
accompanying text, could affect the wisdom of proceeding with individual plaintiffs if defen-
dants argue, and courts recognize, that the savings incurred by treating people in the community
are realized only when an entire hospital or hospital wing is closed.
Vol. 16:501, 1998
Costs and Community-Based Treatment
A third warning against the no-costs approach comes from the review
of section 504 and ADA caselaw from Davis to the present. Part IV re-
vealed how seemingly cost-neutral concepts may serve to disguise courts'
economic concerns. The danger posed by unspoken costs is aptly illus-
trated by Easley, in which the language of costs was replaced by an em-
phasis on program design to the plaintiffs' disadvantage. The danger in-
herent in the no-costs approach is that costs may nonetheless continue to
be a central part of courts' analyses without being explicitly, or even ac-
curately, addressed.
3. Efficiency
This brings us to the third approach, in which costs enter into courts'
decisions explicitly. This approach is often pushed by advocates, who fre-
quently cite studies indicating that community-based placement is con-
siderably cheaper than institutionalization. In fact, one of the most plau-
sible explanations for the presence of cost comparisons in cases brought
under the integration mandate is the simple fact that advocates present
every fact favorable to their clients. Advocates have been eager to trum-
pet the savings gained by treating people in the community because it has
been to their advantage in a case-by-case basis."O
Yet this pure approach, too, should give us pause. At least one author
has voiced uncertainty about the widely-held belief that community-
based treatment is (and will continue to be) less expensive than institu-
tionalization.131 In the Pennhurst case, for example, an expert testified
that personnel costs were the largest expenditure item for both commu-
nity and institutional residences and that the personnel costs were higher
for institutions because of the higher salaries there.132 This fact reflected
the difference in seniority between the institutional and community
staffs, and may not hold true in the future. Community treatment may
also prove to be the more costly alternative if demand for such services
rise. 3 Additionally, as the Eleventh Circuit highlighted in L. C., the rela-
tive costs of institutionalization and community-based care may depend
in part on the state's ability to close entire hospitals or hospital wings.
13
L.C. illustrates the fact that defendants will not necessarily continue to
130. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgement at 29, Helen L
v. DiDario, No. CIV.A. 92-6054, 1994 WL 22714 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1994); Plaintiff's Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement at 21, Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md.
1996). Given the facts in these cases, it is not surprising that costs came to be part of plaintiffs'
arguments and, ultimately, of the courts' analyses.
131. See Burt, supra note 35, at 329-30.
132. See id. at 330.
133. See id.
134. See L.C v. Olmstead, No. 97-8538,1998 WL 163707, at*13 (11th Cir. Apr. 8,1998).
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stipulate that community-based treatment is less expensive than institu-
tionalization. Economics may be used to either side's advantage as the
cost inquiry grows more complex.
Finally, if advocates rely too heavily on cost-based arguments for
community-based treatment, they may run into trouble as defendants
gain experience and hire their own experts to devise very different cost
equations. For how can the definition of the "cost" of community-based
treatment be confined? Does it include the price of housing when people
are living in their own homes? Does it include the administrative costs of
determining who is ready for community-based treatment and when?
What about the costs of the crimes that are committed in the community
by people with mental illness? And what of the costs to property values
of those community residents whose homes are neighboring group
homes, as documented by "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY") groups?
The flexibility and breadth of "costs" may present future liabilities. If the
movement toward community-based treatment ever suffers a strong po-
litical backlash or loses a large part of its current popularity among psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, and legislatures, the costs equation eas-
ily may be rewritten to include "costs" based on the very fears and
stereotypical views of people with mental disabilities advocates hope to
extinguish.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly we, as advocates, are in a bind. We cannot allow the language
of costs to replace the ideal of integration by arguing that integrative
moves are less expensive than the government imagines, especially if they
may not continue to be. Yet if we push costs aside, we risk losing a mid-
dle ground-a risk borne out in the constitutional arena-or having costs
play a role without our participation or rebuttal, as they may be currently
in the statutory arena.
Given these dangers, advocates must try to do two very different
things at once. First, they must acknowledge costs as part of the picture
and push courts to be honest about what financial considerations are be-
hind their decisions. Recall that we are not faced with the question of
whether costs to the government are relevant to the analysis. A careful
look at the role of costs in both the constitutional and statutory arenas
has revealed that costs do and will continue to play a role. Considering
costs will involve making assumptions about various needs of people with
disabilities and some degree of speculation. Advocates should be actively
involved in cost discussions to ensure that those assumptions are accurate
and that any speculation errs on the side of supporting more integration
rather than less.
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Second, and more importantly, they must ensure that costs do not
trump the ideal of integration. Congress has placed an enormous societal
premium on integration and has created a mandate that we must seek to
enforce. Even as we participate in cost discussions, we must be active in
limiting the role that costs play. Advocates must remind courts-through
briefs and through argument-that the ADA was meant to achieve inte-
gration. Many courts have lost sight altogether of the premium placed on
integration and have focused exclusively on costs. Pragmatic concerns
compel us to participate in cost debates which we did not initiate, but
which we cannot afford to ignore. Therefore, each time costs come to the
fore we should invoke the arguments made on the floor of Congress
when the ADA was passed to renew courts' commitment to, and recreate
the spirit of, integration. Advocates are the only people who have the in-
centives to make these arguments resonate in courts' opinions; we must
do so even when we are likely to succeed in the cost debate. Advocates
must be educators.
As thoughtful educators and tenacious litigators, advocates will have
to balance the reality of costs with the ideal of integration. While we must
work to capitalize on cost arguments, we cannot allow costs to trump, or
even to cast a shadow on, integration. In every case advocates will have
to decide how much, and when, to engage in cost discussions. This Note
has emphasized how the caselaw ought to be the advocate's guide. Be-
cause the role of costs shifts over time, advocates should think carefully
about how courts in specific jurisdictions have treated and are treating
costs in order to create and maintain a judicial climate in which people
with disabilities can make progress.
Put slightly differently, a long-term view of the integrationist move-
ment, informed by its history, should replace the case-by-case view in
which cost arguments are spun without an eye to consequence. More
concretely, in a jurisdiction where costs have been eradicated from the
analysis, as in Charles Q, advocates should think twice about bringing a
case involving a particularly expensive integrative move. In fact, advo-
cates might first consider bringing cases in which cost tests would not be
fatal; restoring a modicum of cost-speech might create a less precarious
balance and fortify and protect the recent strides made in the Third Cir-
cuit. And where unspoken costs are lurking in the absence of explicit
cost-based arguments, counsel and judges should be encouraged to be
explicit about costs.
On the other hand, in a jurisdiction where costs have virtually
eclipsed the ideal of integration, advocates should be particularly wary of
emphasizing costs, even where it will be to a particular client's advantage
in a particular case. Where we see too heavy reliance on cost tests, we
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should work especially hard to steer courts away from costs and toward a
focus on integration as a legislatively mandated ideal. Although such a
balancing approach may prove to be difficult in practice, a sharper strat-
egy may come into view as more courts issue additional interpretations of
Helen L. New precedent, particularly precedent that builds on the split
between the Third and Eleventh Circuits, may provide us with a clearer
directive.
In sum, this Note has offered a skeleton of a solution to a very com-
plex and somewhat agonizing problem. It is sincerely hoped that this
Note will foster an exchange among advocates about what the integra-
tionist approach to costs should be. The most important point may be
that the premium that section 504, the ADA, and we as a liberal society
place on integration must not be forgotten; too great an emphasis on
costs may make us lose sight of the importance of the ideal of integration,
and of the spirit of these laws. At the same time, it would be unwise to
deny that the language of costs has become inextricably intertwined with
this ideal, this spirit.
The best that we may be able to do at this point is to continue to
watch and to think critically about how we use and are affected by cost
arguments. The approach offered in this Note navigates a very fine line
between the pure no-costs approach and a pure efficiency analysis. It
does so by demanding that costs or forecasted burdens be explicit while
insisting that the premium that Congress has placed on integration, so
central to the analysis, may never be adequately quantified.
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